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ENGLAND'S COMMUNITY LAND ACT:
A YANKEE'S VIEWt
CHRISTOPHER J. DUERKSEN*
Community land is the most radical single item in Labour's pro-
gramme, and will do more to transfer real power and wealth than all
the other nationalization proposals put together.'
-Anthony Crosland, former
Secretary of State for the
Environment
While American land use authorities explore the taking issue and
methods to ensure reasonable compensation,2 the English3 have
This Article is based upon research conducted under the auspices of the Conserva-
tion Foundation's (Washington, D.C.) Comparative Land Use Project with support from
the German Marshall Fund of the United States and other donors. The author would like to
thank Fred P. Bosselman and David L. Callies for their helpful comments during the
preparation of this Article.
. Associate-Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, Chicago, Illinois. B.A.,
Kansas State Teachers College, 1970; J.D., University of Chicago, 1974.
1. Crosland, Socialism, Land & Equality, SOCIALIST COMMENTARY, March 1974, at
vii.
2. Various aspects of the taking issue, and compensation therefor, are discussed in F.
Bo'SFIMAN. D. CALLIES & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973) [hereinafter cited as THE
TAKING ISSUE]; J. COSTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT: LANDMARK PRESERVATION ANDTHE MARKET-
PLACE (1974); Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Anti-
dotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975);
Costonis. Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973);
Hagman, Windfalls for Wipeouts, in THE GOOD EARTH OF AMERICA: PLANNING OUR LAND
Usu 109 (C. Harriss ed. 1974), also published as A New Deal: Trading Windfalls for
Wipeouts, in 40 PLANNING No. 8, at 9 (1974) and Windfalls for Wipeouts, in TRANSFER OF
DEVFI OPMENT RIGHTS 265 (J. Rose ed. 1975).
3. Because the Community Land Act will be applied in a slightly different fashion in
Scotland and Wales, this article deals only with its use in England.
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mounted a major assault on the thorny problem of "betterment" recap-
ture-recoupment for the public of a part of the increased land values
resulting from community development. 4 The Community Land Act of
19755 provides for the eventual control by local governments of all land
available for development. 6 The Act ultimately will place a duty upon
local planning authorities to buy up all development land within their
respective jurisdictions, thus in effect establishing mammoth land
banks. Compulsory purchase-the English equivalent of eminent
domain-of such development land will be at current use value instead
of market value as is now the case. Local authorities will negotiate with
developers to construct new projects, including housing, on acquired
land. The finished product will be either leased to businesses and indus-
tries or sold to home buyers, with profits flowing to the local community
and the central government according to a prescribed formula. With a
few exceptions, no development whatsoever will be allowed except
where it is carried out by, or on behalf of, a local authority on land
owned by that authority. The result is a truly radical program that, if
fully implemented, will fundamentally alter the planning system and
distribution of wealth and power in England.
The Community Land Act thus will attempt to solve the other side of
the taking controversy that continues to rage in the United States. To
equate the two situations, however, is misleading. Because England has
no written constitution, it has no taking issue in the American sense of
the term. Parliament may and has enacted stringent land use regulations
without providing compensation for the landowner who is denied per-
mission to develop his property.7 But the "betterment" side of the
controversy remains. If a landowner receives nothing in the way of
compensation when denied permission to develop his land, and his
chance for profits is wiped out, what becomes of the windfalls which are
4. "Betterment" is the English equivalent of "windfalls." Betterment was originally
defined as any increase in the value of land (including the buildings thereon) arisingfrom
central or local government action, whether positive (public improvements) or negative
(imposition of restrictions on other land). EXPERT COMMITTEE ON COMPENSATION & BET-
TERMENT (UTHWATr COMMITrEE), FINAL REPORT, CMND. No. 6386 (1942) 260 (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as UTHWArr COMM. RPT.]. It is now taken to mean any increase
in value from any cause whatever.
5. Community Land Act 1975, c. 77.
6. For a full discussion of the Act, see notes 72-97 and accompanying text infra.
7. See Garner, The Law of Land Use Planning in England Today, 15 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 491, 506 (1975). The English view such restrictions as a mere regulation of
property, and because an owner's property is not actually taken from him, no compensa-
tion need be paid. This view is similar to the one advocated in THE TAKING ISSUE, supra
note 2. When a person's land is actually expropriated (compulsorily purchased), however,
Parliament almost without exception has provided compensation.
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doled out to other landowners when their developments are allowed to
proceed? The English have grappled with this question for over three
decades; the history of this effort is marked by one frustration after
another as each successive program came in with a flourish and went out
like a flash. Community Land is the latest and most far reaching effort at
dealing with this fundamental dilemma of land regulation. This Article
examines the basic system of English land control, the predecessors of
the Community Land Act, and the Act itself.
I. THE ENGLISH DEVELOPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM
This country has a planning system that would have made the
Ottoman Empire drool with envy.
-Lord Goodman
Since the passage of the Town and Country Planning Act of 19478
England has been subject to a comprehensive system of land develop-
ment controls. 9 This system has two basic facets. First, elected local
planning authorities'0 must draw up two types of development plans,
structure and local.II Structure plans are written statements formulated
by county councils outlining broad policy goals for a certain area and
indicating the manner in which land is to be used and the stages by which
development is to be carried out. These plans provide a framework
within which local plans must be drawn. These local plans are much
more detailed and are accompanied by a map similar to an American
zoning map. These plans differ, however, from American zoning maps
8. Town and Country Planning Act 1947, 10 & II Geo. 6, c. 51.
9. For an excellent summary of the English development control system by an
American writer see N. ROBERTS, THE REFORM OF PLANNING LAW (1976). See also D.
HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, ch. 21 (2ded. 1975).
A good comparative article is Garner & Callies, Planning Law in England and Wales and
in the United States, I ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 292 (1972). More up-to-date commentary is
found in Garner, The Law of Land Use Planning in England Today, supra note 7. Standard
references by English writers include D. HEAP, AN OUTLINE OF PLANNING LAW (6th ed.
1973) and A. TELLING, PLANNING LAW AND PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1970).
10. England is divided into 38 county councils and six metropolitan authorities (e.g.,
Greater Manchester). These authorities have power over regional functions and
"strategic" planning. Each country council is divided into several district councils that
perform local functions (street repair etc.) and operate the planning system on a day-to-
day basis following general policies set down by the counties. Metropolitan councils are
also typically divided into smaller borough councils. London has its own organization
which is basically similar, with the Greater London Council acting as a county authority
with 33 borough councils constituting a second tier. For a chart depicting this scheme see
Garner, An Introduction to English Planning Law, 24 OKLA. L. REv. 457, 458 (1971).
!1. The first structure plans are only now being approved. In other areas, old-style
development plans remain in force. Conversation with George Dobry, in Chicago, Ill.,
Aug. 25, 1976.
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in that they act only as a guide to developers and planners.' 2
The second facet of development control relates to the individual
planning application. Generally, all development 3 must receive indi-
vidual approval from the local planning authority, either a county or
district council depending on the size or impact of the project. While the
applicable development plan serves as a guide, the local authority is not
bound by it and may consider each application on its merits. 14 As in this
country, a good deal of give and take may occur between the local
authority and the developer before planning permission is granted. If the
application for planning permission is denied, however, neither the
owner of the property nor the developer is entitled to any compensation,
except in rare instances.15
The central government in England plays a much more important role
in the planning system than the federal government in the United States.
All power emanates from the central government and local authorities
have only those powers granted to them. Within the central government,
the Department of the Environment (DOE) oversees all land use and
environmental planning. DOE is a super-agency combining many of the
functions of our Departments of Interior, Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, and the Environmental Protection Agency. It is headed by the
Secretary of State for the Environment, a cabinet minister who is a
member of Parliament belonging to the majority party-in this case,
Labour. 6 The Secretary frames new planning legislation, issues orders
12. Theoretically they also ensure that the local planning authority does not have
unbridled discretion in considering individual planning applications. Because of long
delays in the appeals system, see, e.g., Garner, An Introduction to English PlanningLair,
supra note 10, at 464-66, local authorities have a great amount of discretion, limited for the
most part only by economic and political considerations. A penetrating critique of the
system is found in G. DOBRY, REVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT CONTROL SYSTEM, FINAL
REPORT (1975).
13. Development is defined broadly in § 22 of Town and Country Planning Act of 1971,
c. 78, as: "the carrying out of building operations, engineering operations, mining
operations or other operations in, on, over or under land, or the making of any material
change in the use of any buildings or other land."
14. Preliminary consultations with the developer are conducted by professionals
within the local planning department. They then make recommendations to the elected
officials of the local planning authority who have final authority on whether the project
will be approved.
15. There has been some confusion among American commentators on this point,
which has been expressed at planning law conferences attended by the author. Compensa-
tion is paid in England for revocation of planning permission once granted and in other
exceptional circumstances. That country has a very liberal compensation code for persons
or businesses detrimentally affected by government projects (highways, airports, etc.). In
almost all instances involving a refusal of planning permission, however, there is no
compensation whatsoever. Town and Country Planning Act 1971, c. 78, § 164.
16. At the time the Community Land Act became law, the head of the Department of
[Vol. 12:49
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and regulations to clarify and carry out existing law, and provides
guidance to local planning authorities. He must confirm all structure
plans before they take effect and also hears most appeals from decisions
of local planning authorities.17 When a development application has
regional or national importance, the Secretary can call in the application
and make the decision himself after holding a public inquiry.
The courts and legal profession play a comparatively minor role in the
English planning system. There are two overriding and related reasons
for this situation. First, England has a unitary system of government in
which Parliament is supreme. While a court can interpret legislative
intent or statutory meaning, it has no power to declare a law unconstitu-
tional. Thus Parliament has the power to enact any legislation, however
absurd or oppressive; the safeguards against such are political and
traditional, not legal.' 8
Secondly, in planning legislation Parliament has left little room for the
courts to interfere. The planning process is viewed as being political and
discretionary, not inflexible and adversarial. Legislation is of two types.
It either spells out definitions and procedures in great detail, leaving the
courts little to interpret, or more commonly, it delegates to the Secre-
tary of State for the Environment broad powers to draft discretionary
regulations and procedures. Similarly, the planning appeals system is
almost entirely administrative, with the Secretary's decision final in all
but exceptional instances. And while lawyers function as advocates in
the appeals system, their role is much different from that of their
counterparts in the United States, since there is no body of binding
precedent in the planning appeals system and no decisions are regularly
published by the Department of Environment. The belief is that there
are no right answers in planning and therefore each case must be treated
individually. Thus lawyers have served basically to present their client's
case and attack their opponent's. There is, however, a recent trend
the Environment (DOE) was Anthony Crosland. Crosland was recently elevated to the
position of Foreign Secretary under the new Labour Government of Prime Minister James
Callaghan. Crosland was replaced at DOE by former Secretary of Trade, Pete Shore. The
Manchester Guardian Weekly, Apr. 18, 1976, at 5, col. 4.
17. A planning inspector actually hears appeals and makes nonbinding recommenda-
tions to the secretary who renders the final decision. Although the secretary gives
"reasons" for his decision, these are often brief and cannot be challenged in court since
his decisions are based on policy grounds.
18. S. DE SMITH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 72-73 (1974). During the
past year, however, there has been increasing concern in England that a bill of rights may
be needed to protect individual liberties. This concern has been brought about in part by
what has been perceived as an increased willingness of Parliament to enact oppressive
legislation. See THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 1976, at 28, col. 1.
1976]
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away from even this minor role. As one commentator observed: "All
recent developments in administrative procedures. . . have one com-
mon denominator-the retreat from the adversarial process."' 19 This
movement toward conciliation and investigatory inquiries in the plan-
ning system is illustrated by the Town and Country Planning Act of
1971.20 The act adopted an informal procedure for presenting structure
plans rather than the old system of a development plan inquiry with its
courtroom atmosphere.21
England thus has a complex planning scheme featuring what is
perhaps the most sophisticated system of land development control in
the Western World. It is a planner's dream deifying professional plan-
ners, not lawyers.22 In spite of this, no one was entirely satisfied with the
system. For example, English planners chafed at its so-called negative
orientation.23 The planners could approve or reject a project once pro-
posed by a developer, but they viewed themselves as impotent until a
plan was proposed. If they had actual control of development land, the
yellow cross-hatching on the development plan indicating offices, for
example, would result in real office space. The Community Land Act
was designed to remedy this and other perceived shortcomings.
II. COMPENSATION AND BETTERMENT IN ENGLAND-
THE EARLY PLANNING ACTS
Prior to World War II, English planning faced the basic dilemma that
restrains land use planning in the United States today. Under the earliest
planning acts, 24 local authorities were required to pay compensation to
any person whose property was "injuriously affected" by any provision
of a planning scheme, unless the restrictions imposed related to protec-
tion of health or certain aspects of the "amenity of the area.' '2 Thus
while the law empowered local authorities to limit an owner's rights to
do as he pleased with his land, they found exercising such powers to be
prohibitively expensive.
19. G. GANZ, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 109 (1974).
20. Town and Country Planning Act 1971, c. 78.
21. Id. §§ 6-15. See also GANZ, supra note 19, at 110.
22. As a lawyer, this author cannot fail to note that when the English found their
planning machine grinding slowly to a halt, they called upon a barrister to grease the
works. See generally G. DOBRY, supra note 12.
23. Interview with David Hall, Director of Town and Country Planning Ass'n, in
London, Dec. 12, 1974.
24. Housing, Town Planning etc., Act 1909,9 Edw. 7, c. 44; Housing, Town Planning
etc., Act 1919,9 & 10 Geo. 5, c. 35; Town and Country Planning Act 1932,22 &23 Geo. 5,
c. 48.
25. See, e.g., Housing, Town Planning etc., Act'1909, 9 Edw. 7, c. 44, § 59(l); Town and
Country Planning Act 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 48, § 18.
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The early acts of 1909 to 1932 also addressed the betterment issue.26
They authorized the recovery of fifty percent of any increase in the
value of property arising from approval of a planning scheme. But such
provisions were unsuccessful, since no betterment was ever recovered
under these acts.27
A. The Uthwatt Report
During the Second World War the mood in England "hardened sig-
nificantly in favor of central planning and there was a deep determina-
tion to create a new social order and put an end to the urban and
community problems of the past.'"' A number of committees were
appointed to examine proposals for a new planning system. In 1941 the
Expert Committee on Compensation and Betterment, chaired by Mr.
Justice Uthwatt, was directed "to make an objective analysis of the
subject of the payment of compensation and recovery of betterment in
respect of public control of the use of land." 29 The underlying assump-
tion of the Uthwatt Report was that betterment should be recaptured to
a certain extent by the community. It defined betterment as: "any
increase in the value of land (including the buildings thereon) arising
from central or local government action, whether positive, e.g., by the
execution of public works or improvements, or negative, e.g., by the
imposition of restrictions on other land." ' 30 The committee also
examined two factors to which it attached particular importance in
solving the betterment and compensation problem-"floating value ' 3 1
26. See, e.g., Town and Country Planning Act 1932, 22 & 23 Geo. 5, c. 48, § 21.
27. A. TELLING, supra note 9, at 271.
28. G. CHERRY, THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH TOWN PLANNING 120 (1974).
29. Id. at 121. See also K. DAVIES, LAW OF COMPULSORY PURCHASE AND COMPENSA-
TION 218-21 (1973) (detailed treatment of the Uthwatt Report).
30. UTHWATr COMM. RPr., supra note 4, at 260 (emphasis added).
31. "Floating value" was explained by the Uthwatt Committee in the following
manner:
Potential development value is by nature speculative. The hoped-for building may
take place on the particular piece of land in question, or it may take place elsewhere;
it may come within five years, or it may be twenty-five years or more before the turn
of the particular piece of land to be built upon arrives. The present value at any time
of the potential value of a piece of land is obtained by estimating whether and when
development is likely to take place, including an estimate of the risk that other
competing land may secure prior turn. If we assume a town gradually spreading
outwards, where the fringe land on the north, south, east and west is all equally
available for development, each of the owners of such fringe land to the north, south,
east and west will claim equally that the next development will "settle" on his land.
Yet the average annual rate of development demand of past years may show that the
quantum of demand is only enough to absorb the area of one side within such a period
of the future as commands a present value.
1976]
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and "shifting value.' '32 These concepts have "profoundly influenced
the policies of successive Governments, and they may fairly be
described as the basis of the present system of compensation for plan-
ning restrictions." 33
The Uthwatt Comittee concluded that the answer lay not in dealing
with individual owners-that is, taking from Peter the gain arising from
a grant of planning permission to pay Paul who was denied unfettered
use of his property. Rather, the committee suggested the immediate
nationalization of all development rights in undeveloped land outside
urban areas upon payment of fair compensation. 34 Compensation, the
Committee believed, would be nominal because of the location and lack
of development demand for such property.35 Foreshadowing the Com-
munity Land Act, the Uthwatt Report further recommended that when
undeveloped land in the countryside was ripe for development, govern-
ment should acquire such land at existing use value for development by
Potential value is necessarily a "floating value" and it is impossible to predict with
certainty where the "float" will settle as sites are actually required for purposes of
development. When a piece of undeveloped land is compulsorily acquired, or
development upon it is prohibited, the owner receives compensation for the loss of
the value of a probability of the floating demand settling upon his piece of land. The
probability is not capable of arithmetical quantification. In practice where this
process is repeated indefinitely over a large area the sum of the probabilities as
estimated greatly exceeds the actual possibilities, because the "float," limited as it is
to actually occurring demands, can only settle on a proportion of the whole area.
There is therefore over-valuation.
Id. 23-24.
32. With respect to "shifting values," the committee wrote:
The public control of the use of land, whether it is operated by means of the
existing planning legislation or by other means, necessarily has the effect of shifting
land values; in other words, it increases the value of some land and decreases the
value of other land, but it does not destroy the land values. Neither the total demahd
for development nor its average annual rate is materially affected, if at all, by
planning ordinances. If, for instance, part of the land on the fringe of a town is taken
out of the market for building purposes by the prohibition of development upon it, the
potential building value is merely shifted to other land and aggregate values are not
substantially affected, if at all. Nevertheless, the loss to the owner of the land
prohibited from development is obvious, and he will claim compensation for the full
potential development value of his land on the footing that but for the action of the
public authority in deciding that development should not be permitted upon it, it
would in fact have been used for development. The value which formerly attached to
his land is transferred and becomes attached to other land whose owners enjoy a
corresponding gain by reason of the increased chance that their land will be required
for development at an earlier date.
Id. 26.
33. A. TELLING, supra note 9, at 272.
34. UTHWATr CoMm. Rpr., supra note 4, at 368.
35. Id. 27.
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a public authority or for resale or lease to a private developer.3 6 For
developed land, the major proposal was to have a general valuation
every five years in conjunction with continuing property tax valuations.
An annual value, the amount for which the property would rent for a
year, would be established initially and a charge of seventy-five percent
levied on any increase in annual value thereafter. 37 If the increase was
attributable, however, to further development or improvement on the
property, there would be no recapture. 38
One of the key conceptual aspects of the Uthwatt Report, often
overlooked, relates to the definition of betterment and the final recom-
mendation respecting recapture of the increase in annual value. Instead
of recouping only that portion of betterment attributable to government
action, as explicit in its original definition, 39 the Uthwatt Report avoided
identifying the cause of that betterment, aside from actual cost of
construction on the property,' and levied on the increase in value from
any cause whatever.4 Thus even if the value of vacant land skyrockets
because of an adjacent private housing development, the increase
should flow to the community. Although the Uthwatt Report never
admitted that it departed from the original definition of betterment, this
shift in theory presaged further changes found in later planning legisla-
tion and finally the Community Land Act.
B. The 1947 Act and the Boom Years
After the war, a rash of progressive social legislation was enacted in
England, including the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947.42 While
the Act did not adopt the Uthwatt proposals, its underlying spirit was
quite similar.
Development rights in all land were nationalized. No development
could take place without planning permission, 43 a one hundred percent
development tax was levied when permission was granted, 44 and in most
36. Id. 58.
37. Id. 311.
38. Id. T 319.
39. See text at note 30 supra.
40. See text at note 38 supra.
41. UTHWATr COMM. RPT., supra note 4, at 310.
42. Town and Country Planning Act 1947, 10 & II Geo. 6, c. 51. This Act included, in
addition to its betterment provisions, a complete reform of development control law. For
general discussion of the Act see J. CULLINGWORTH, TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING IN
ENGLAND AND WALES 147-49 (4th ed. 1972).
43. Town and Country Planning Act 1947, 10 & I1 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 12.
44. Id. § 69; [1948] 1-3 STAT. INSTR. 4164 (No. 1189).
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cases no compensation was payable if permission was refused.45 If the
state compulsorily acquired land, it paid only existing use value since it
already owned the development rights. 46 The basic premise was that all
betterment was created by the community and, because it was unrealis-
tic and undesirable to distinguish between values increased by govern-
ment action and those due to private activity within the community, the
whole increment would be retained by the community. Due to political
realities, however, the operation of the new law was softened by the
establishment of a £ 300 million fund to partially compensate owners
who could successfully claim their land had some development value on
the date the Act came into operation. 47
As J.B. Collingworth, a noted planning expert, has written, "These
provisions . . were very complex, and, together with the inevitable
uncertainty as to when compensation would be paid and how much it
should be, resulted in a general feeling of uncertainty and discontent
which did not augur well for the scheme. ' '48 In practice, the financial
provisions proved a disaster and, at the behest of developers and private
property interests, were soon dismantled.49
The Conservatives took office in 1951 intent upon increasing con-
struction activity, especially in private housing. Because development
charges were viewed as a hindrance to this effort, the Tories abolished
them and denationalized development rights in 1953.50 New provisions
were introduced in 1954 under which compensation for refusal of plan-
ning permission was restricted to loss of the development value which
accrued up to 1947 only. 51 No development charges were imposed if
permission was granted. 52 One commentator has satirized:
.. .the strange tragedy of Miss Bett (who had disappeared, appar-
ently seduced by the wicked landowner) and Mr. Comp (a con-
45. Town and Country Planning Act 1947, 10 & I I Geo. 6, c. 51, § 20.
46. Id. §§ 50-51.
47. Id. § 58.
48. J. CULLINGWORTH, supra note 42, at 148.
49. MINISTRYOF HOUSING AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, REPORT 1951-1954, CMND. No.
9559 (1955). Pressure to jettison the financial provisions intensified when a certain Mr.
Pilgrim committed suicide upon learning that land for which he had paid full development
value (500), in ignorance of the act, was to be compulsorily acquired at existing use value
(;65) by local authority. "Why," Winston Churchill asked Harold MacMillan, "have you
done this man to death-you and your minions." Schaffer, The Town and Country
Planning Act, 1947, 60 THE PLANNER, May 1974, at 694.
50. Town and Country Planning Act 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, c. 16.
51. Town and Country Planning Act 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 72.
52. Id.
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sumptive who had for forty years been chasing Miss Bett but to no
avail). . . . In 1947 they were nearly brought together by that
distinguished matchmaker, Lord Silkin. In 1954, Mr. Macmillan,
the well known magician, while producing 300,000 houses in one
year out of a hat with one hand has spirited Miss Bett away with the
other. Do not miss our thrilling next instalment. Will Miss Bett be
found? Will Mr. Comp survive?53
Unfortunately the situation produced by the 1954 act turned out to be
even more complex and bewildering than that existing before. Private
sales continued to take place at current market prices, but compensation
for compulsory purchase (eminent domain) was at existing use value
plus any established 1947 development value, a smaller amount than
current market value in most instances. In effect, a dual market in land
was created. The unlucky landowners who were refused planning per-
mission still received nothing, and if their land was taken for public use,
they pocketed less money than they would have on the open market. But
if a landowner or developer did secure permission to build, he reaped a
double windfall because the 1954 scheme had put nothing in place of the
development charge.
This situation, with its obvious inequalities, could not last long. Public
opinion became aroused as private pressures for development grew into
the beginning of London's ill-famed development boom. 4 The govern-
ment was forced to take action. The Town and Country Planning Act of
195955 brought things full circle by restoring fair market value as the
basis of compensation for compulsory acquisition. In theory, the same
price was received for land whether it was sold to a private individual or
to a public authority.
On the surface things looked much better, but the results were costly
for local authorities that now had to pay full market value for land
acquired for public purposes. Further, the 1959 act did nothing about the
fundamental problem of betterment. The basic injustice was that an
owner refused planning permission still received no compensation,
since the state owned all development rights as a result of the earlier
planning acts, while an owner granted permission was in effect given
back his development rights free of charge. To exacerbate matters, the
53. G. CHERRY, supra note 28, at 153.
54. This development boom has been ably chronicled in 0. MARRIOTT, THE PROPERTY
BoOM (1967). Mr. Marriott, who was financial editor of The Times (London), apparently
decided to cash in on the boom as he later left the newspaper to head a large property
investment company. Another interesting publication is COUNTER INFORMATION SERVICE
ANTI-REPORT ON THE PROPERTY DEVELOPERS, THE RECURRENT CRISIS OF LONDON (1973).
55. Town and Country Planning Act 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § i.
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owner who did receive permission was in effect given a bonus-his land
values were inflated due to operation of the planning system which
refused development on other sites and thus restricted supply.
C. The Land Commission and Beyond
Mounting disenchantment with this situation, coupled with a reaction
against the runaway property boom in London, enabled the Labour
Government, which was returned to power in 1964, to employ a double-
barreled attack. The 1965 Finance Act5 6 introduced for the first time a
capital gains tax of about thirty percent aimed at increases in existing
use value. In addition, the Land Commission Act of 1967, 57 created a
new betterment levy on increases in development value. 58 It also estab-
lished a commission to hold development land59 so that it would be
available when needed for local and regional plans and so that it would
not be withheld from the market as happened under the 1947 act. The
levy was charged on the sale, lease or material development of prop-
erty6° and was deducted from the price paid by the commission on its
own purchases. 6' The levy was pegged at forty percent, instead of the
one hundred percent required by the 1947 act, in hopes of providing
some development incentive. 62
But from its inception, the Land Commission Act was plagued with
problems. 63 Local government units resented a central government
agency's interference with local planning. And because a wealth-
distribution policy was piggy-backed onto the planning aspect of the act,
it was predictably unpopular with landowners. Viewing the act as an
unwarranted infringement on private property rights, the Conserv-
atives, upon regaining power, abolished the Land Commission in 1971.64
Up to this time the Land Commission had completed purchase of just
2,800 acres of land and only £ 100 million of betterment levy had been
collected.65
56. Finance Act 1965, c. 25, §§ 19-22.
57. Land Commission Act 1967, c. 1.
58. Id. § 27-36.
59. Id. §5 1-5.
60. Id. § 29(1).
61. Id. § 72, sched. 9.
62. STAT. INSTR. 1967, No. 544.
63. See N. ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 245.
64. Land Commission (Dissolution) Act 1971, c. 18.
65. 808 HANSARD, Dec. 16, 1970, col. 1474. It should be noted, however, that all
development prior to April 6, 1967, was exempt from the Land Commission Act of 1967,
and developers rushed into projects to beat the cut-off date. Thus much development land
fVol. 12:49
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Ironically, in the midst of this confusion and in spite of a welter of new
legislation, developers continued to line their pockets. Office blocks
popped up overnight in London like mushrooms, helping to make for-
tunes for a covey of developers,' and the price of development land
throughout England skyrocketed. By late 1973, however, the public was
so disenchanted with these developers that the Tories were persuaded to
introduce a new "windfall" recapture measure-a development gains
tax that substantially tightened up the taxation of capital gains on the
sale of land and buildings. Certain development gains were to be taxed at
the maximum income tax rate (eighty-three percent for individuals,
fifty-three percent for corporations), and the first leasing of any non-
residential development was treated as a disposal for tax purposes. The
Conservative Party fell from power in 1974 before the measure was
passed, but the Labour Government adopted the original proposal67
which remained in force until the Community Land Act was adopted.
The Labour Government, however, was not satisfied with this solu-
tion since each time Labour had attempted to attack the betterment
question, its actions had been repealed by a subsequent Conservative
Government. The Labour Party decided to try a new approach.
Anthony Crosland, then Secretary of State for the Environment, said:
"We must now come to the fundamentals of the matter and commit
ourselves to the public ownership of land."68 Thanks to the excesses of
the property developers who had become a symbol of all that was
inequitable, the Labour Government was able to gain the necessary
support for this policy. As journalist Simon Jenkins noted:
It is a remarkable feature of British politics in the Seventies that
Labour Party plans for nationalization of urban development land
should have been regarded as relatively noncontroversial, so much
so that they were safely elevated from the status of a campaign
slogan to that of actual legislation. . . . For private development
was available which was not subject to the Act. In addition, the old pattern of developers
holding back on plans in anticipation of a victory by the Conservative Party, which would
repeal the law, was repeated. Again, the developers were rewarded for their patience.
66. See 0. MARRIOT, supra note 54, at 121-45, 181-96. Harry Hyams purchased
Oldham Estates Co., Ltd., in 1958 for £50,000 with its assets valued at about £20,000. By
November 1973, Hymans had parlayed this into property with an equity value of £1 10
million!
67. Finance Act 1974, c. 30, §§ 38-48, sched. 3-10. Because of its complexity and
because the bottom dropped out of the property market in 1975, the development gains tax
was never implemented. For a discussion of these provisions see Moore, The Taxation of
Development Gains, J. PLAN. & ENVIRONMENT L., Nov. 1974, at 634.
68. Labour Party, Notes for Speakers 18 (1974). Labour was particularly impressed
with the Swedish approach to land banking. See N. ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 259.
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has become so profoundly suspect that hardly a voice is raised in
protest at its being run politically out of town.6 9
In September of 1974 the Labour Government published a White
Paper 70 outlining its proposals to municipalize all development land, not
just development rights, at existing use value. New legislation would be
designed to secure positive planning, reduce the cost of development
land and capture betterment values for the community.71 By March 1975
the government had introduced a Community Land Bill that embodied
the ideas set forth in the White Paper. John Silkin, Minister of Planning
and Local Government under Anthony Crosland and a Labour Party
left-winger, was given charge of the Bill and immediately began to
shepherd it through Parliament. After a bloody battle, Community Land
became a reality.
III. THE COMMUNITY LAND ACT
The Communist Land Bill is the most odious compendium of hor-
rors since the works of Edgar Allen Poe.
-Hugh Rossi, Conservative Party Spokesman
on Housing and Land
Mr. Silkin did not expect Tory approval when he brought the Com-
munity Land Bill before Parliament, yet no one quite expected what he
69. S. JENKINS, LANDLORDS TO LONDON: THE STORY OF A CAPITAL AND ITS GROWTH
272-73 (1975).
70. LAND WHITE PAPER, LAND, CMND. No. 5730 (1974).
71. The White Paper said:
It is not generally disputed that the community itself must control the development
of land, and the planning system that has evolved has often been a potent force in
preventing development that is harmful to the community. But our system of plan-
ning control is largely a negative one. The community, via its elected local authority
and, in the final analysis, central Government, can veto proposals for development,
but the initiative is left largely in private hands. The community does not at present
have sufficient power always to plan positively, to decide where and when particular
developments should take place. Public ownership of development land is designed
to give this power to its rightful owner, the community.
Side by side with the need to secure positive planning, the nation has to deal with
another problem, that of land prices and betterment. "The growth in value, more
especially of urban sites, is due to no expenditure of capital or thought on the part of
the ground owner, but entirely owing to the energy and enterprise of the commun-
ity. . . .It is undoubtedly one of the worst evils of our present system of land tenure
that instead of reaping the benefit of the common endeavour of its citizens a
community has always to pay a heavy penalty to its ground landlords for putting up
the value of their land." (Rt. Hon. David Lloyd George - Official Report 29th April
1909, Vol. IV, Col. 532). The public ownership of development land will secure these
increments for the community that has created them.
Id. at 1. A more complete discussion of the reasoning behind Labour's position on
development land can be found in D. LIPSEY, LABOUR & LAND (Fabian Tract No. 422,
1973); Crosland, Socialism, Land & Equality, supra note i, at iii.
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ultimately presented. As is typical with English legislation, the bill itself
established only a skeletal framework, with implementation to be
accomplished by DOE's secretary. The bill envisioned a transitional
period of two to three years ;72 during this period local authorities were to
have the power (but no duty) to purchase and develop all development
land within their jurisdictions. In other words, "the squires of Barset-
shire will be free to acquire no land at all, but the red-hot activists of little
Moscow Borough Council will be able to acquire everything in sight."73
By placing land acquisition powers with local authorities, the Labour
Government hoped to avoid the animosity generated by the former
Land Commission's interference with local planning. The bill also
required land acquistion and management schemes to be drawn up for
DOE review. Under such schemes, regard was to be paid to the relevant
development plan, but the local authority was given great discretion in
this respect. 74
Also, during the transitional period developers who were allowed to
proceed with projects would pay a new development land tax of about
eighty percent, a tax not embodied in the Community Land Act itself but
to be enacted in separate legislation.75 The tax would be levied when
development was initiated not when it was finished. 76 Land purchased
by local authorities during the transitional period, whether compulsorily
or by agreement, would be compensated for at market value minus the
72. Community Land Bill 1975, cl. 9.
73. Widdicombe, The Community Land Bill-A Commentary, 234 ESTATES GAZETrTE
522 (May 17, 1975). This view was borne out during a recent interview with the chief
planning officer of a Conservative-dominated local authority. Interview by Fred Bossel-
man with J. Henwood, Chief Planning Officer, Torbay Borough Council, in Torquay, Jan.
7, 1976. Mr. Henwood thought the Conservative Council would be slow to respond to the
Act.
74. Community Land Bill 1975, cl. 17. Such schemes will be prepared on a five-year
basis and must contain a "planning statement" defining the broad geographical areas in
which the local authorities plan to operate and indicate the categories of land identified for
acquisition and disposal. DOE has indicated that the schemes will serve to provide orderly
plans for the operation of the act and to enable the government to ascertain progress as to
implementation, to provide a means of economic control over local authority spending,
and to inform the private sector of the local authorities' intentions. See The Community
Land Bill & Local Authorities, 234 ESTATES GAZETrE 601 (May 24, 1975).
75. DEVELOPMENT LAND TAX 1975, CMND. No. 6195. Only increases in development
value will be taxed. Increased in current use value will be subject to the capital gains tax.
The proceeds of the tax will be split as follows: 40% to the central Treasury; 30% among all
local authorities; 30% to the local authority where the development takes place. Local
authorities have expressed anger at the substantial cut the central government has taken
for itself.
76. Criticism has been leveled at this aspect of the tax because of the absence of any
cash realization to meet tax liability at this point. Johnson, Development Land Tax BillJ.
PLAN. & ENVIRONMENT L., Apr. 1976, at 212.
1976]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
development land tax which would have been payable had the land been
sold privately. A tribunal was established to ameliorate cases of finan-
cial hardship. 77
The transitional period would end when the DOE secretary thought
appropriate, and at that point local authorities were to be vested with a
duty to buy up all land needed for "designated relevant development"
within the next ten years.78 As a result, no development could take place
thereafter except on land which was in or had passed through local
authority ownership. These authorities could either build themselves or
lease the land for development by others. At this point the development
land tax would not be levied but a new type of compensation would be
established under which an owner received not market value minus the
tax, but current use value only.
One generalization that can be made of the Community Land Bill is
that few people liked it. Editorial comments ran from "Recipe for
Failure" 79 to "Without a Friend."80 Yet, with the exception of several
significant amendments, the bill was eventually enacted as written.
Foremost among critics was the powerful English planning profession
led by the Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA). Maurice
Ash, its chairman, lamented, "The Bill drags planning through the dirt.
When all is done, there will be nothing left of planning. "81 Among other
things, the planners revolted against Clause 17(3) allowing local
authorities to acquire development land without any reference to the
planners' development plans. Planners immediately took the offensive
and the end result was the first major concession; as enacted, the Act
requires local authorities to acquire land with regard to the relevant
development plan.82
Planners also joined with lawyers and others to-question abrogation of
the long-established right to a public inquiry whenever a local authority
exercised its power of compulsory purchase (eminent domain).8 3 The
77. Development Land Tax Bill, cl. 29 (the bill was enacted and became effective Aug.
1, 1976).
78. Id. at cl. 27.
79. The Observer, May 4, 1975, at 10, col. 1.
80. 234 ESTATES GAZETTE 963 (June 28, 1975).
81. Ash, The End of the Affair, 43 TowN & COUNTRY PLAN. 244 (May 1975).
82. Community Land Act 1975, c. 77, § 17.
83. The public inquiry process is the English equivalent of the environmental impact
statement required by the National Environmental Policy Act. Objectors to a planning
scheme or compulsory purchase order are given the opportunity to object and present
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government relented and the Act now requires a local public inquiry if
there has been no previous opportunity for such an inquiry through
normal planning procedure (e.g., during adoption of the relevant struc-
ture or local plans).84 Local authorities, however, may ignore objections
that the acquisition is unnecessary or inexpedient. This is a major
alteration in public inquiry law, 85 and one which has caused great con-
cern for environmentalists. 86 On the other hand, councils will be
required to state the reason for acquiring land, although not the precise
purpose for which it is to be used.
The legal profession also worried about the broad discretion given the
Secretary and local authorities. The Administrative Law Committee of
Justice, a group of lawyers concerned not with the policy reasons for the
legislation but with "upholding and strengthening the role of law and
preservation of the fundamental liberties of the individual," joined the
debate:
The Committee considers that the Bill in its present form is
unacceptable from a constitutional point of view because so much
of major importance to the proposals is left to delegated legislation,
and because the Bill confers wide and unprecedented discretionary
powers on local authorities and on the Secretary of State ...
[L]egislation which is merely a loose frame for future administra-
tive action and which gives no real guide to what is going to happen
in practice should not be accepted by Parliament. Apart from being
constitutionally unacceptable, this mode of proceeding creates an
impossible degree of uncertainty, which the Committee believes is
inconsistent with the role of law.87
In the face of such criticism, the government whittled down the
discretionary powers to some extent in another major concession.88
alternative schemes. Environmental groups such as the Council for the Protection of Rural
England (CPRE) view the public inquiry as a key weapon to their arsenal against environ-
mentally unsound development. Interview with Robin Grove-White, CPRE, in London,
June 27, 1975.
84. Community Land Act 1975, sched. 4. Environmentalists are still dissatisfied,
arguing that hearings on abstract development plans are not a substitute for close scrutiny
of particular development decisions.
85. Id., Sched. 4, 6(b).
86. Statement by Lord Henley, Chairman, CPRE, in CPRE Newsletter 6 (Autumn
1975). See note 83 supra.
87. J. PLAN. & ENVIRONMENT L., July 1975, at 344.
88. For example, the definition of "relevant development" was originally to be pre-
scribed by the Secretary, but under clause 3 of the definition is spelled out in much greater
detail. Even so, other provisions would be termed apoplectic by Professor K.C. Davies,
such as the provision giving local authorities great discretion in establishing disposal
notification areas wherein the landowner must notify the local authority if he intends to
sell his land. Community Land Act 1975, c. 77, sched. 8. See Davies, supra note 29, at
218-21.
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A third major concession centered around land and development
which would be excepted or exempt from the Act. Owner-occupied
housing was exempted originally, but little else. As finally passed, the
Act "exempts" 89 land use for agriculture, forestry, mining and rebuild-
ing or altering buildings which increase floor space by no more than ten
percent.90 Furthermore, the government has promulgated regulations
which will "except" 91 small development projects such as housing
schemes of 1,000 square meters floor space or less or industrial build-
ings of 1,500 square meters or less and most recreational buildings. 91
These concessions were based as much on the country's economic
problems as they were on political considerations. 93 While giving way on
these points, the Labour Government successfully opposed numerous
other amendments, including further restrictions on the secretary's
discretionary powers, greater rights for objectors at public inquiries,
and the placing of priority on completion of structure and local plans
over the duty to acquire land.94
Once the Community Land Act passed on November 12, 1975, the
government set to work promulgating various guidelines and regula-
tions. Local authorities were instructed to draw up their initial land
acquisition management schemes by the end of 1975 in preparation for
the "first appointed day," April 6, 1976. 91 Simultaneously, the govern-
89. "Exempt" development will be totally excluded from the scheme's operation and
local authorities will thus have no power to acquire such development. Community Land
Act 1975, c. 77, sched. 1.
90. Id.
91. "Excepted" development will be within the scope of acquisition power, but the
presumption will be that the power will not normally be used to acquire land for such
development except in unusual circumstances, e.g. land assembly for large-scale rede-
velopment. PLANNING BULLETIN, Sept. 29, 1975.
92. The Times (London), Jan. 16, 1976, at 2, col. 5.
93. Interview with David Hall, Director, Town & Country Planning Association,
in Chicago, Oct. 30, 1975. Chancellor of the Exchequer Dennis Healey has pushed
through a wide range of stringent economic measures aimed at cutting government
expenditure. Local government has been the prime target of such cuts, which have been so
deep that Anthony Crosland reportedly considered resigning his cabinet position in
protest. SeeTHE ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 1976, at 75; PLANNING BULLETIN, July 26, 1976, at I.
The government has made clear that the costs of the Community Land Act will not be
allowed to become a charge on rates (property taxes). Borrowing for land purchases will
be secured by the local authorities revenues, although receipts and expenditures will be
recorded in a separate account subject to yearly governmental approval. Initial gearing up
costs will be subsidized by the central government. DOE Circular 128/75 (Dec. 19, 1975).
94. COMMUNITY LAND BILL, COMMON REASONS FOR DISAGREEING WITH CERTAIN OF
THE LORD'S AMENDMENTS (1975).
95. PLANNING BULLETIN, Dec. 8, 1975, at I. After the "first appointed day" local
authorities will have the power but no duty to acquire development land.
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ment began work on its development land tax which will operate in
tandem with the Act until "existing use value" compensation for com-
pulsory purchase is introduced. % A Development Land Tax Bill has
recently been presented to Parliament and came into effect during
August, 1976. 97
IV. DEVELOPMENT CONTROL AND COMMUNITY LAND
Under the Community Land Act, as of April 6, 1976, planning
authorities have the power to acquire land needed for "relevant"
development. 98 Because local authorities are not under an immediate
duty to acquire such land, most planning applications will still be han-
dled in the normal way.99 When local authorities are finally given a duty
to acquire development land, the English land development control
scheme will be completely altered. 100
Under the Act's procedure, when an authority receives an application
for "relevant" development it must decide whether or not to acquire the
land; this decision must be made within the time allowed for deciding a
planning application, eight weeks, or a longer period if extended by
agreement. 101 At the same time, the authority is to consider the planning
merits of the application. If the authority decides to acquire the land, it
must serve a notice of its intention to do so. 102 Planning permission, if
granted, is then suspended for twelve months to give the authority time
to acquire the property either by agreement or compulsory purchase.
Should the authority elect not to acquire the property, it must issue a
notice to that effect. 10 3 Even if the local authority decides not to pur-
chase the land, however, it may still refuse planning permission and no
compensation is payable to the landowner. Should planning permission
be granted and no notice of acquisition served, the authority loses its
%. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text supra.
97. As presently conceived, the tax would not apply to development gains under
£1 0,000, and the first £ 150,000 of development gain above £ 10,000 would be levied at a rate
of 66 2/3%. Development Land Tax Bill, cls. 12-13. Sales in excess of £150,000 would be
taxed at 80%. Id., cl. 1.
98. "Relevant" development is basically any development that is not "exempt" or
"excepted." See notes 89, 91 and accompanying text supra.
99. See notes 13-15 and accompanying text supra. A minority of applications, how-
ever, will be handled according to a new procedure under the Act.
100. This will be on the "second appointed day," perhaps in the mid- 1980's. Commun-
ity Land Act 1975, c. 77, § 25d, sched. 2.
I01. Id. § 20. It should be noted that although a planning application must by statute be
decided within eight weeks, it is a deadline seldom met. SeeG. DOBRY, supra note 12, at 36.
102. Community Land Act 1975, sched. 7.
103. Id.
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powers to compulsorily acquire the land for a period of five years,'°4 and
development may proceed in accord with any conditions imposed.
If the local authority'0 5 buys the land, it has two alternatives: 1)
develop the land itself after receiving consent from the Secretary of
State for the Environment; or 2) dispose of it to a private developer. 106
To encourage private developers to continue to identify land ripe for
development by submitting planning applications, the authority must
give the developer or the former owner of the land "prior negotiating
rights."'17 While these rights do not guarantee the ability to buy back the
land to carry out the development or even to act as the developer under a
building agreement, the developer and former owner are in theory given
an "inside track" in dealings with the local authority. If they are not
interested, the local authority must try to obtain the best possible
financial deal from another developer.1
0 8
It should be noted that if the land is used for homebuilding, the
freehold will generally be disposed of directly to the final purchaser. For
all other types of development, the property will typically be disposed of
by leasehold or terms which ensure that the community shares in any
future increases in value.
V. WILL COMMUNITY LAND SUCCEED?
Probably the only safe prognostication that an American lawyer
should make about the Community Land Act is that the English coun-
tryside will not turn red, or even pink-at least not for the time being.
But the specter of Communism haunts Conservatives who are pledged
to repeal the whole scheme should they regain power. This promise
could prove to be the very undoing of the Act if private property owners
sit back and wait for a change of government, concealing land suitable
for development and possible acquisition.
A related worry must be 'that the landowners themselves will have
insufficient incentive to submit planning applications, as occurred
under both the 1947 and 1967 acts, because of the development land tax.
The government fortunately intends to peg the tax at only 66 2/3 percent
104. Id.
105. Initially compensation will be paid on the basis of market value minus develop-
ment land tax. Later, it will be limited to existing use value only. Development Land Tax
Bill, cl. 27.
106. Community Land Act 1975, § 42.
107. Id., sched. 6.
108. Id.
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(instead of 80 percent as originally planned)"° for developments valued
up to £ 150,000 and to exempt those valued at less than £ 10,000.11' This
should help to some extent, but surely landowners will not rush to notify
planners that their land is developable. Once existing stocks of develop-
ment land are exhausted (in about two years), then local authorities may
be hard pressed to come up with more."'
And even if land is available, many observers wonder whether the
local authorities can do the job,1 2 in view of the ineptness some of them
have displayed as developers in the past. Yet one must be cognizant of
the major housing programs already completed by local authorities in
England (one-half of all housing since World War 11)113 and a good
number of successful town center redevelopment schemes, often
undertaken in partnership with developers. 114 Some authorities will
undoubtedly fail miserably under the Act, while others with sufficient
staff, expertise and the ability to take advice from the central govern-
ment and private property experts, will not only provide needed
development but also turn a tidy profit for the community. If the failures
come first and are spectacular, the Act may be doomed.
With local authorities acting as developers, one must also wonder
what will become of the vaunted English development control system.
Despite its so-called "negative" orientation," 5 that system has surely
been successful in doing what it was asked-controlling development in
a country with a population of about 55 million in an area about the size
of Wisconsin. One can only marvel at the absence of sprawl and the
resulting open countryside and coastline. Of course there have been
109. Goy, Development Land Tax, J. PLAN. & ENVIRONMENT L., Nov. 1975, at 638.
110. See note 77 supra. The Conservatives are pushing for a 52% tax rate ort develop-
ment gains. PLANNING BULLETIN, Feb. 23, 1976, at 1.
I11. See James, The Landowners' Role in THE NEW LAW OF THE LAND 33 (1975). It
should not be assumed that the compulsory acquisition procedures will be speedy, even
though the ultimate acquisition will take place at near-existing value. In addition, local
authorities will have to first identify the land desired and come up with the money to
purchase it.
112. As one commentator notes, "They are sometimes accused of buying dear and
selling cheap. They do not exist to take risks or make profits." Interview with Sir
Desmond Heap, in London, June 26, 1975.
113. Interview with Roger Warren-Evans, former Managing Director of Bovis Homes
Southern Ltd., in Uxbridge, Sept. 10, 1974.
114. Interview with John Delafons, Director of Civil Accommodations, Public Ser-
vices Agency, DOE, in London, July 8, 1975. See also Boynton, The LocalAuthorities'
Role in THE NEW LAW OF THE LAND 11 (1975). Many of these town center schemes are
aesthetic disasters and others have become economic white elephants.
115. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
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costs,I"6 but the English seemed overly anxious to muck about with their
planning machine. Mr. Silkin, responsible for guiding the Act through
Parliament, has spoken of the creative tensions and opportunities pre-
sented to local authorities, planners and developers."17 No doubt such
opportunities are there, but it is equally likely that local authorities may
disregard theplanners, their plans and even the people, to push through
development proposals. As in the United States, local authorities in
England have often run roughshod over any opposition to their large-
scale grandiose redevelopment schemes.
Another serious problem involves the two-tier system of local govern-
ment in England. "8 Already, disputes have occurred between the large
county authorities and the smaller district councils over planning
strategy and the formulation of land acquisition and management
schemes." 9 A district authority may favor a big commercial develop-
ment to ease its finances, but find itself opposed by the stronger county
council which does not want to cope with the added traffic. Further
problems may arise if one authority is Labour controlled and the other
dominated by the Conservatives. Such disputes, which must ultimately
be settled by the DOE Secretary, could hamstring implementation
unless resolved quickly.
In spite of all these difficulties, there are several reasons why the Act
may succeed. First of all, it will not become fully effective for some
time. The duty to acquire development land remains distant, probably in
the 1980's,20 and financial restraints will hold back even the most
zealous Labour councils, at least for the present. Thus with gradual
implementation local authorities may have sufficient time to adapt to
new roles at their own pace. Furthermore, it must be remembered that
local authorities in England already have much development experi-
ence, notably in housing and city center redevelopment schemes. If they
can draw on lessons from the acclaimed (and profitable) new town
program, things may not be so bad. Many commentators have in the past
criticized the English planning system for ignoring financial realities. 2
The Community Land Act should solve this.
116. For example, the cost of having land has been driven up by restriction on supply.
See 2 P. HALL, THE CONTAINMENT OF URBAN ENGLAND 399 (1973).
117. Address by Rt. Honorable John Silkin, Minister for Planning & Local Govern-
ment, Town & Country Planning Association National Conference, London, Dec. 4, 1975.
118. See notes 10-15 and accompanying text supra.
119. PLANNING BULLETIN, Jan. 12, 1976, at 1.
120. PLANNING BULLETIN, Feb. 23, 1976, at i.
121. Interview with David Eversley, Centre for Environmental Studies, in London,
June 23, 1975.
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Perhaps the most encouraging portent for the Act comes from the
development industry. Proving that necessity makes strange bedfel-
lows, the powerful British Property Federation pledged itself to cooper-
ate with the government and local authorities and urged the Conserva-
tives to drop their promise to repeal the Act. Upon examination, how-
ever, the development industry's response is not all that surprising. For
years English developers and builders have lamented the lack of cer-
tainty they have faced in dealing with land planning authorities.122 The
prospect of some fixed terms of reference in land development, albeit
unpopular, reassures industry leaders.lu On top of this, developers
must be attracted by the land banking aspect of the scheme which
releases them from the need to maintain expensive stocks of land while
seeking planning permission.
The Labour Government also appears to have abandoned much of its
early rhetoric concerning the Act and is pressing local authorities to
cooperate with developers. In Community Land Circular 6,124 "which
may well become a procedural Bible on this complex piece of legislation
and its interpretation,"'" DOE noted that authorities "will have a
special role as owners of development land" but stressed "they will
normally look to the private sector both for finance and development
skills needed to achieve development.' ' 2 6 The Circular also made clear
that the government expects local authorities to be flexible in setting
disposal conditions so that developers can secure construction financ-
ing and meet market requirements. 27 In addition, the importance of
certainty is stressed:
[Als authorities become major and, in due course, exclusive sup-
pliers of land for different types of relevant development, builders
and developers will need to be able to look to them with confidence
for a continuing supply of land so as to ensure continuity of opera-
tion. Disposal procedures will have to cater for the needs of the
building firms of differing sizes and levels of activity, recognize
that the larger firms in particular have to be able to make forward
plans often extending over a period of several years, and help
smaller builders to operate efficiently. Appropriate methods will
122. Interview with Roger Warren-Evans, former Managing Director of Bovis Homes
Southern Ltd., in Uxbridge, Sept. 10, 1974.
123. ESTATE TIMES (Oct. 24, 1975).
124. Land for Private Development: Acquisition, Management & Disposal, (Mar. 15,
1976).
125. J. Hillman, The Guardian, Mar. 18,1976, quoted inPLANNING BULLETIN, Mar. 22,
1976.
126. DOE Circular 26r76, at 6.
127. Id. at 13-14.
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need to be worked out in consultation with builders and
developers. 28
In the end, success may depend on the character of the English
themselves. That spirit of compromise and cooperation which pervades
English life in general and is clearly evident in the planning and environ-
mental fields, will undoubtedly exhibit itself in the implementation of
the Community Land Act. 129 The mood in England was perhaps best
captured by a recent commentary:
It was evident that there was a considerable variety of opinions
as to the possibility of the new provisions succeeding where the
1947 and 1967 Act attempts failed. If the prevailing view was
foreboding of a further failure to establish a workable system, this
was perhaps tempered by an absence of any very clear and convinc-
ing reasons why the Act should necessarily fail.
If it is assumed that wise and far-seeing decisions will be taken
by the Secretary of State in relation to . . . the discretions and
powers with which he will be invested, then perhaps the scheme of
the Act will work, and the foretellers of doom be confounded. After
all, a quarter of a century ago similar forebodings were voiced in
great strength about legislation such as that establishing the New
Town-to which tributes are now paid from all 
sides. 3 t
VI. LESSONS FOR THE UNITED STATES
On a practical level, those interested in land use in America would be
wise to observe the working relationships which evolve between local
authorities and developers under the Community Land Act, which is
basically a sophisticated land banking scheme. Across the United States
developers are lamenting the increasing lack of uncertainty in this
country's system of land use controls. They should consider the advan-
tages of having a reliable set of rules to go by, guaranteed by a local
government with a stake in the project.'31 Furthermore, with land carry-
ing costs escalating in the face of an annual inflation rate of six percent,
developers may begin to recognize the advantages of the government
bearing such costs. Fewer and fewer investors are willing to make
128. Id. at 15.
129. Contrast this to recent rumblings from the Adirondack Park in New York, It was
recently reported that a little old lady physically attacked an official of the Adirondack
Park Agency which had the audacity to impose controls on her land. AUDUBON, March
1976, at 118.
130. J. PLAN. & ENVIRONMENT L. 625 (Nov. 1975).
131. See Hodges, Planning Partnership is Best Course for Land Developers, Local
Governments, ENVIRONMENTAL COMMENT, March 19, 1975, at 6, which explores the
possibilities of such a system.
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long-term interest loans, again because of inflation, thus sources of
capital are likely to start insisting on equity positions. Developers are
therefore likely to rely more on building and management contracts as a
source of profits as their English counterparts will be doing under the
Community Land Act. Arrangements established in England should
provide some valuable guidance for developers on this side of the
Atlantic.
From a more theoretical standpoint, the most important lesson to
distill from the English experience is that a system of stringent land use
controls cannot work unless the problems of betterment and compensa-
tion are adequately handled. The English realized this three decades
ago; only now is that fact being recognized here. For many years we
have concentrated on the compensation aspect while ignoring better-
ment (windfalls). Now that strict land use controls are being upheld in
courts, 32 attention has belatedly turned to windfall recapture as a means
of obviating any losses or wipeouts resulting from land use restrictions.
Ironically, development interests often insist that eminent domain is the
only acceptable approach to strict land use control. But just as the
failure to maintain betterment recapture led to a revolt against develop-
ers in England, so could such opposition to windfall recapture inevitably
lead to increased police power regulation here.'33
This is not to say the United States should or can adopt the English
approach. The English disposed of the compensation problem in one
stroke-Parliament merely said there would be none. 34 For a time,
however, they ignored the betterment issue and consequently landown-
ers were given huge windfalls when granted planning permission. When
reaction set in, the accepted course was to tax development gains
heavily but not to provide for transfer between winners and losers. This
approach somehow seems "unfair" to an American audience and would
probably be rejected on such grounds, aside from constitutional prob-
lems. 35 In the United States, because of concern over compensation,
132. See, e.g., Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285
N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972).
133. See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation, supra note 2, at 1045-46.
134. See note 15 and accompanying text supra. Seegenerally Garner, The Law of Land
Use Planning in England Today, supra note 7, at 506. The original £300 million hardship
fund is the only exception. See notes 43-47 and accompanying text supra.
135. "The constitutional requirement of just compensation derives as much content
from the basic equitable principles of fairness. . . as it does from technical concepts of
property law." United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973).
The concept of fairness is woven throughout our approach to land use controls. As
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the gap between winners and losers has not been as marked, and thus the
pressure for windfall recapture has been considerably less intense. But
things are changing. To ignore the growing problem of windfalls and
wipeouts could doom any hope of adequate land use planning in this
country. 13 6
The "fairness" concept may also restrain us in another way from
emulating the English approach. The Community Land Act is premised
on the assumption that any development gain, from whatever source,
should be recaptured for the community. Of course, not all such gains
are attributable to governmental action, but beginning with the Uthwatt
Report 137 the English have ignored this point. To finely tune our system
to this reality would necessarily increase its complexity. Perhaps this
can be avoided by simply levying a development gains tax at a relatively
low rate.
On the other hand, windfall recapture in the United States could
proceed without other aims complicating the scheme of the Community
Land Act, namely, wealth redistribution and positive planning. Windfall
recapture in this country simply has nothing to do with wealth redis-
tribution, 13S nor with establishing the government as developer. The goal
is to buttress our system of land development control by providing
compensation for planning restrictions, and to direct growth rather than
to allow local authorities actually to undertake development.
A second related lesson of the Community Land Act concerns the
question of "who develops?" One of the underlying premises of the Act
is that once government interference in land use is accepted, it is myopic
to give government officials the power to say only where development
should not occur.139 Thus, local authorities are given considerable
power to direct growth in a positive manner. But one of the strong points
of the prior English planning system was the power of local authorities
to say "no" to development. The Community Land Act casts the local
noted by one authority in a recent zoning dispute, "Throughout zoning's history the
criticism, whatever its tilt, has had a common theme: Local zoning was abusive of due
process, both procedurally and substantively." Brief for National Association of
Homebuilders, American Society of Planning Officials and American Institute of Planners
as Amici Curiae at 17, City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2308
(1976). For an excellent exposition of the fairness concept as it relates to compensation,
see Costonis, "Fair" Compensation, supra note 2.
136. For a good commentary on this point, see Hagman, Windfalls for Wipeouts, supra
note 2.
137. See notes 28-41 and accompanying text supra.
138. Hagman, Windfalls for Wipeouts, supra note 2.
139. N. ROBERTS, supra note 9, at 248.
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authorities as both the gamekeeper and poacher. The wisdom of such a
dual role is questionable. In addition, even the English worry about the
possibilities for corruption under the new system. 110 It might have been
much wiser for the English to divorce the positive planning aspect (i.e.,
government as developer) from windfall recapture; it would be impera-
tive in this country. 141
On the other hand, the English experience indicates that any windfall
recapture or land banking scheme which usurps local government plan-
ning powers is in for trouble. Witness the fate of the 1967 Land Commis-
sion.1 42 A delicate balance must be struck between the need for honesty
and accountability and the political realities of local government
control.
If nothing else, the history of betterment recapture attempts in Eng-
land shows that a national consensus on the subject is needed not only
for the sake of developers but also for local government, planners,
environmental groups and the public. In the past, successive Labour
Governments have forced legislation through only to have it repealed by
the Conservatives. Because no consensus was reached before the legis-
lation was introduced, it had little hope of surviving the changes of
governments. Along the same line, the planning system itself seems to
self-destruct every few years. The result in both instances is a lack of
stability which is to the benefit of no one in the environment game.
Unfortunately, the Community Land Act does not appear to have the
kind of broad support that such a radical program will need to survive,
although hopefully for England a consensus will evolve in time.
In the United States we face similar difficulties since there is no broad
consensus on the proposed national land use act. 43 The taking issue
continues to attract comment,144 but developersare antagonistic to even
those proposals which might forestall widespread police power regula-
tion. 145 Without some solution to the wipeout problem, two unsatisfac-
140. Brackett, The Developers' Role, in THE NEW LAW OF THE LAND 40 (1975). A
recent article in THE ECONOMIST, July 17, 1976, at 18, col. 2, noted that while public
corruption is rare in England, most corruption centers on planning decisions and local
government housing and development contracts.
141. The local government might be the land banking authority, but the land would be
sold or leased to private developers in accord with existing development plans for the area.
142. See notes 42-71 and accompanying text supra.
143. See, e.g., S. 632, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 10294, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974). See also Haskell, A National Land Use Policy, 7 NATURAL RESOURCES LAW. 257
(1974); Reilly, New Directions in Federal Land Use Legislation, 1973 URBAN L. ANN. 29.
144. See note 2 supra.
145. Costonis, "'Fair" Compensation, supra, note 2, at 1045.
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tory alternatives are on the horizon. Either the developers will find
themselves painted into a corner when public opinion finally demands a
change or the American planning system will continue to creak along
ineffectually, unable to direct growth in an environmentally sound
manner.
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